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Liquidating According to Capital Accounts:
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Almost every tax practitioner who has prepared or explained a limited
liability company ("LLC") agreement has at one time or another faced the age-old
question: should the LLC liquidate according to positive capital accounts?1 For some
practitioners, the answer is often an unequivocal "yes". After all, by not liquidating
according to capital accounts, the LLC members will forego the benefits of the
sacred §704(b) substantial economic effect safe harbor.2  Without safe harbor
protection, the members have absolutely no assurance that the government will not
seek to undo prior tax allocations on audit. Accordingly, regardless of whether LLC
members actually understand even the basics of capital account maintenance, they
may be informed by their tax advisors that they simply must liquidate based on
capital accounts.
Over the past few years, however, fewer tax practitioners have
recommended capital account based liquidations for LLCs. In fact, in some industry
settings, liquidation provisions based on capital accounts have virtually disappeared
from LLC agreements altogether. Instead, a movement toward liquidating LLCs
based on a stated liquidation schedule or formula unrelated to capital accounts has
The check-the-box Regulations, effective for tax years beginning after 1996, have substantially increased the
use of LLCs. See Treas. Reg. §§301.7701-2 and -3. See generally Pillow, Schmalz, and Starr, "Simplified
Entity Classification Under the Check-the-Box Regulations," 86 JTAX 197 (April, 1997). In this article, all
references to "LLC" or "member" refer to an entity taxed as a partnership or a partner, respectively.
All section references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
or the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.
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gained momentum. Further, as more and more LLC agreements adopt liquidation
provisions based on a stated liquidation schedule or formula, fewer and fewer tax
practitioners worry about the need to liquidate according to capital accounts.
Should tax practitioners worry about liquidating LLCs according to
capital accounts? Like so many questions, the answer depends on the
circumstances. As this article will discuss in detail, in some circumstances LLCs
simply must liquidate according to capital accounts in order to avoid serious adverse
tax consequences. Conversely, in other circumstances, formula based liquidations
unrelated to capital accounts may accomplish the goals of the LLC members without
raising any problems. In still other circumstances, however, formula based
liquidations may create more problems than they solve.
Section 704(b)
Under §704(b), the government will respect allocations of partnership
tax items provided that they have "substantial economic effect".3 Alternatively,
allocations not having substantial economic effect will be respected only if they are in
accordance with the "partner's interest in the partnership" ("PIP").4 To have
substantial economic effect, allocations must have "economic effect" and that
3 §704(b)(2).
4 §704(b); Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(1)(i).
economic effect must be "substantial".5  To have "economic effect", (i)the
partnership making the allocations must maintain capital accounts; (ii)the
partnership must liquidate according to capital accounts; and (iii) if a partner has a
deficit capital account upon liquidation, the partner must be obligated to restore its
deficit balance or the partnership must satisfy an alternate test.6
If allocations of items fail to satisfy the substantial economic effect test,
the government will reallocate the items to the extent necessary to correspond with
PIP.7 Under the PIP test, tax items are shared among partners based on their
overall economic arrangement, taking into account all facts and circumstances.8 PIP
provides very few bright line rules. Nevertheless, if partnership allocations satisfy
the first two prongs of the economic effect test but fail to satisfy the third prong of
that test (relating to deficit capital accounts), the PIP test generally will determine a
partner's interest by comparing (a) the manner in which the partnership would make
distributions and receive contributions if it sold all of its property and immediately
liquidated following the end of the year with (b) the manner in which the partnership
Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(i). Because a full discussion of the substantiality requirement is beyond the
scope of these materials, we will focus primarily on the economic effect element of the substantial economic
effect test.
6 Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).
7 §704(b); Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(1)(i).
8 Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(3)(i). The PIP test begins with a presumption that all interests are equal on a per
capita basis. However, taxpayers or the government may rebut this presumption by establishing facts and
circumstances showing that a different result is appropriate.
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would have made distributions and received contributions if it sold all of its property
and immediately liquidated following the end of the prior year, after making certain
adjustments. 9
Both the substantial economic effect test and the PIP test are intended
to match allocations of income and loss with economic benefits and burdens. Thus,
because both tests have the same ultimate objective, the PIP test will often place the
taxpayer in the same position it would have been in had it satisfied the substantial
economic effect test in the first place. The substantial economic effect test, however,
provides taxpayers with the certainty of a safe harbor as well as the accompanying
benefits of other favorable rules. The PIP test, on the other hand, exposes
taxpayers to the unpredictability of a facts and circumstances test that very few, if
any, tax experts are comfortable applying.
The Debate: Liquidating By Capital Accounts or By Distribution Formula
As discussed above, allocations ultimately determine distributions
under the substantial economic effect test. Although this approach provides
taxpayers with safe harbor benefits, it often concerns tax advisors and their clients
for three major reasons. First of all, many clients simply do not understand capital
accounts or the significance of income and loss allocations. Without this
understanding, they often have great difficulty signing documents overflowing with
Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(3)(iii).
references to capital accounts and citations to the §704 regulations. In these
situations, both clients and tax advisors are likely to walk away from their
transactions less than fully satisfied, even if their transactions go forward.' 0
Secondly, although clients often do not understand capital accounts,
they often are comfortable with common corporate provisions. As a result, they often
prefer including the equivalent of corporation distribution provisions in their LLC
agreements. The substantial economic effect test does not have a corporate
equivalent. Many clients, therefore, may resist including language in their LLC
agreements necessary to meet the test. Instead, they will often lobby for distribution
provisions similar to those commonly found in corporate documents.
Finally, both clients and tax advisors alike typically do not want
mistakes or unexpected interpretations of the §704(b) regulations to alter the
economic arrangement between LLC members. Indeed, if capital accounts and
allocations ultimately govern distributions, a mistake in making allocations can have
serious business repercussions. Further, if an unexpected interpretation of the
allocation regulations ultimately can affect the overall business arrangement, LLC
members seeking the benefit of the safe harbor effectively will permit those with
10 Because clients may be unknowledgeable about capital accounts and allocations, they are unlikely to
appreciate the tax advisor's efforts in drafting or critiquing complicated allocation provisions. Even worse,
because of this lack of appreciation, they may resist paying the tax advisor's bill.
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authority over interpreting those regulations (that is, the government or the courts) to
dictate the terms of their business deal.
In response to these concerns (as well as others), many LLC
agreements have adopted approaches allowing distributions of cash and property to
determine allocations of income and loss. These alternative approaches allow
clients to focus solely on the distribution provisions of their agreements; provisions
that they generally believe they understand very well. Further, these approaches
often mirror common provisions found in corporate documents. Finally, clients often
feel comfortable that, under these alternative approaches, mistakes in making
allocations or unexpected interpretations of the allocation regulations ultimately will
not affect their economic expectations.
If an agreement adopts a formula distribution approach, liquidating
distributions generally will follow the operating distribution provisions of the
agreement, as opposed to capital account balances. As the examples below will
illustrate, sometimes this approach may work quite well. In other cases, however,
the approach may raise more questions than it resolves. Indeed, as we shall see,
sometimes liquidating according to a distribution formula can cause unexpected
adverse consequences.
Examples
Example 1: Economic Effect Equivalence. A and B form LLC as equal 50-50
members, and each member contributes $100,000 to LLC. During its first year, LLC
.7-
(i) makes no distributions, (ii) earns $15,000 in net operating income, and (iii)
purchases an asset for $5,000 which increases in value to $10,000 before the end of
the year. In its second year and at a time when there is no additional net income or
loss, LLC liquidates and distributes $110,000 in assets to each of A and B.
Upon formation of LLC, A and B enter into an agreement which captures their
economic deal and satisfies the substantial economic effect safe harbor. Under their
agreement, LLC will (i) maintain capital accounts, (ii) allocate all items of profit and
loss equally, (iii) liquidate according to capital accounts, and (iv) require
unconditional deficit capital account restoration obligations. Based on these terms,
(i) in year one, LLC allocates $7,500 in income to each of A and B and
correspondingly increases A's and B's capital account from $100,000 to $107,500,
(ii) in year two, LLC allocates $2,500 of unrealized asset appreciation to each of A
and B and correspondingly increases A's and B's capital account from $107,500 to
$110,000,11 and (iii) at the end of its second year, LLC liquidates based on capital
accounts and distributes $110,000 to each of A and B.
If A and B maintain the same economic arrangement but decide not to liquidate
based on capital accounts, LLC is still likely under these simple facts to receive the
safe harbor benefits of the substantial economic effect test under the economic
effect equivalence doctrine. Under the economic equivalence doctrine, allocations
not otherwise having economic effect are deemed to have economic effect provided
that a liquidation at the end of the current year and all future years would produce
identical economic results to the partners as would occur if the partnership satisfied
the three-part economic effect test.12 Relying on economic effect equivalence, A and
B could decide to simply liquidate 50-50. Alternatively, they could agree to make all
distributions 50-50 and liquidate based on how they agreed to make current
distributions. Finally, they could issue equal amounts of "units" or other indicia of
ownership to themselves and liquidate LLC according to such ownership. Under any
of these three common alternatives to a capital account based liquidation, A and B
would receive identical liquidation amounts at the end of year one and year two. Any
of the three approaches, therefore, should protect LLC from unwanted reallocations
upon audit. 13
11 See Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(e).
12 Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(2)(i).
13 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(5), Ex. (4)(ii) and (4)(iii).
Notable commentators have referred to the economic effect equivalence doctrine as
the "dumb but lucky rule". 14 This may imply that a practitioner would have to be
exceptionally foolish to rely on the doctrine or extraordinarily fortunate to apply the
doctrine without creating some harm to his or her clients. Nevertheless, with a
simple economic arrangement such as the one described above for A and B,
economic equivalence will do the trick. Accordingly, if A and B decide for whatever
reason that liquidating according to capital accounts is not to their liking, they are not
harmed by choosing one of the three common alternatives described above.
Example 2: Foreign Entities Taxed As Partnerships.
A, a US resident, and F, a French resident, form SARL, a French Soci6t6 &
responsabilit6 limit6e, to operate a new business venture in France. A and F agree
that A will hold 60% of the ownership interests in SARL and F will hold 40%. A and
F contribute proportionate amounts of capital to SARL, and SARL incurs no entity
level debt. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. §301.7701-3(c)(1), SARL files Form 8832 (Entity
Classification Election) and makes a "check-the-box" election to treat itself as a
partnership for US tax purposes. 15
A prepares draft governing documents for SARL which provide for the maintenance
of capital accounts and a liquidation based on capital accounts. F, who understands
little about capital accounts and is even less interested in learning about them, is
reluctant to sign A's draft documents. F's French counsel, moreover, advises F not
to sign the drafts. After some debate, A and F agree to not maintain capital accounts
and simply share profits, losses and liquidation distributions based on their shares or
"parts" in the SARL (that is, 60% to A and 40% to F).
By not maintaining capital accounts or liquidating according to capital accounts,
SARL clearly will not satisfy the primary or alternate three-part economic effect test.
Nevertheless, similar to the discussion above in Example 1, A should still receive the
benefits of the substantial economic effect safe harbor. Because A and F will share
all SARL items 60-40, A's potential liquidation distributions should never vary from
the amounts A would receive in a capital account based liquidation. As a result,
SARL's "allocations" to A should receive safe harbor protection by satisfying the
economic effect equivalence test.
14 See, e.g., McKee, Nelson and Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, T10.02[1] n. 23 (3rd
ed. 1997).
15 Under Treas. Reg. §301.7701-3(a), SARL will qualify as an "eligible entity" for purposes of the check-the-box
regulations. Accordingly, SARL should be eligible to file a Form 8832 and to elect partnership status for US
tax purposes.
As an aside, if F or a party related to F subsequently loans funds to SARL, tax
deductions may begin to move in a direction other than 60-40. As SARL's
deductions become debt-sourced as opposed to equity-sourced (that is, as SARL
incurs expenses in excess of contributed member equity), F will bear, or be deemed
to bear, the economic burden associated with those deductions. As a result, the
Treasury Regulations will mandate that F receive the deductions for tax purposes. 16
Accordingly, if A anticipates SARL borrowings from F or parties related to F, A may
wish to include safe harbor language in the SARL governing documents to ensure
compliance with the tax regulations.
Example 3: Distributing Preferred Capital Before Common.
A and B each contribute $100 for a 50% interest in the common units of LLC. A
contributes an additional $1,000 for preferred units which entitle A to a 10%
preferred return. In year one, LLC earns $50 of net income and LLC liquidates. The
LLC agreement provides that income is first allocated to A to satisfy its preferred
return and thereafter allocated equally between A and B. LLC allocates the $50 of
year one income to A in partial satisfaction of its preferred return.
If LLC follows a capital account based liquidation, A's capital account would equal
$1,150 (that is, its original $1,100 total contributions plus its $50 share of year one
income), B's capital account would equal $100 (that is, its $100 of originally
contributed capital) and LLC would make liquidating distributions accordingly.
Distributions may differ, however, if LLC followed a priority distribution liquidation
approach. Under one approach, LLC distributes cash first to return A's contributed
capital and preferred return, and then to A and B equally according to their relative
share of common units. In such a case, A would receive $1,100 on its preferred
units and the remaining $150 of assets would be distributed equally between A and
B in accordance with their common sharing ratios. Accordingly, A receives $1,175
and B receives $75 as compared to liquidation based on capital accounts where A
receives $1,150 and B receives $100.
Capital Account Approach A B Total
$1,150 $100 $1,250
Priority Distribution Approach A B Total
Return preferred A capital $1,000 $1,000
A's preferred return $100 $100
Residual to Common $75 $75 $150
Total $1,175 $75 $1,250
16 Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(i)(1).
This example illustrates how a real economic difference may exist between a capital
account based liquidation and a priority distribution liquidation. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to envision an argument as to why LLC's overall
allocations would satisfy the economic effect equivalence test under a priority
distribution approach. Nevertheless, regardless of the application of the §704(b)
safe harbors, it appears that LLC would allocate the $50 of income to A under either
distribution alternative as A shares in the economic benefit of the $50 under either
approach.1 7 Moreover, in the priority distribution liquidation, the members would also
need to consider how to treat the $25 of capital that has shifted from B to A as a
result of the priority distribution approach. 18 In this case, since the $25 accrued
solely due to the passage of time as a return on capital and was not based on the
income of LLC, the "shift" may be treated as a guaranteed payment under §707(c). 19
Example 4: Effect of Cumulative Preferred.
Similar to Example 3, A and B each contribute $100 for a 50% interest in LLC
common units, and A contributes an additional $1,000 for 10% preferred units. In
year one, LLC earns $200 of income and, at the end of year two, LLC liquidates.
The LLC agreement provides that income is first allocated to A to satisfy its
cumulative preferred return and is thereafter allocated equally between A and B. In
year one, the $200 of income is allocated first to A to satisfy its $100 preferred return
and thereafter $50 each to A and B in accordance with their relative share of
common units.
If LLC follows a capital account based liquidation approach, A's year two capital
account would equal $1,250 (that is, A's original $1,100 total contributions plus A's
$150 share of year one income) and B's capital account would equal $150 (that is,
B's $100 of originally contributed capital plus B's $50 share of year one income). On
the other hand, in an effort to avoid the capital shift that occurred in Example 3 and
still follow a priority distribution liquidation approach, LLC may provide for the
following distribution formula in lieu of a capital account based approach: First,
17 Of course under PIP, there is no guarantee as to how income or loss will be allocated.
18 For a more detailed discussion of capital shifts and how to treat them for tax purposes see Steven Schneider
& Brian O'Connor, LLC Capital Shifts: Avoiding Problems When Applying Corporate Principles, 92 J. Tax'n
13 (2000).
Under §707(c), a guaranteed payment is defined as a payment to a partner that is determined without regard
to the income of the partnership. In this example, the $25 will shift from B to A regardless of the income or
loss of LLC. As a result, it may appropriately qualify as a guaranteed payment for tax purposes. Guaranteed
payment treatment would result in $25 of ordinary income to A and a $25 deduction to LLC.
return A's preferred contributed capital; Second, return A's and B's common
contributed capital; Third, distribute proceeds to satisfy A's cumulative preferred
return; Fourth, distribute any remaining proceeds equally to A and B in accordance
with their common sharing ratios. The difference between this distribution formula
and the priority approach in Example 3 is that the common contributed capital is
returned before the preferred return. However, even under this revised distribution
priority, the economics between the capital account based approach and the priority
distribution approach differ and create the potential for a capital shift or guaranteed
payment.
For example, if LLC follows a capital account based liquidation, A's capital account
would equal $1,250 (that is, its original $1,100 total contributions plus its $150 share
of year one income) and B's capital account would equal $150 (that is, its $100 of
originally contributed capital plus its $50 share of year one realized income). Thus,
upon LLC's liquidation, LLC would make liquidating distributions accordingly. Under
the distribution formula outlined above, however, LLC would distribute its $1,400 of
total assets first to return A's preferred capital ($1,000), second to return A's and B's
common capital ($100 each) and third to return A's cumulative preferred return
($200). Thus, the total distributed would be $1,300 to A and $100 to B, which is
different from the distributions under the capital account based approach ($1,250 to
A and $150 to B). The reason for this difference is that, although sufficient income
exists over the life of LLC to satisfy the cumulative preferred return, the income was
not earned evenly over the life of LLC. Accordingly, if LLC liquidates at the end of
year one, B truly would benefit from the $50 allocation. The preferred return in year
two, however, causes the benefit of the $50 to move from B to A.
Capital Account Approach A B Total
$1,250 $150 $1,400
Priority Distribution Approach A B Total
Return preferred A capital $1,000 $1,000
Return Common Capital $100 $100 $200
A's Preferred Return $200 $200
Residual to Common $0 $0 $0
Total $1,300 $100 $1,400
Example 5: Admissions of Service Partners.
A and B form LLC to operate an active business, and each contributes $50,000 to
LLC in exchange for equal 50% interests. LLC's interests are not publicly traded.
LLC generates no net income or loss during its first two years of operations.
Nevertheless, its market value triples from $100,000 to $300,000 during the same
two-year time period. At the very beginning of year three, LLC issues a one-third
LLC interest to C as compensation for services provided to LLC in anticipation of C
becoming an LLC member. A and B inform C that they believe the interest qualifies
as a profits interest. Thus, based on Rev. Proc. 93-27,2o C assumes that the interest
will not be taxed as compensation provided C does not dispose of the interest within
two years.
Under Rev. Proc. 93-27, an interest in LLC may qualify as a profits interest as long
as the interest has no current liquidation value. If LLC liquidates based on capital
accounts and satisfies the other substantial economic effect requirements, LLC can
ensure that C's one-third interest qualifies as a profits interest by "booking-up" the
capital accounts of A and B pursuant to Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(iii)
immediately before issuing an interest to C. By booking-up, LLC will deem a sale of
all of its assets for $300,000 and adjust A's and B's capital account upward to reflect
the gain from the deemed sale (that is, increase each of A's and B's capital account
from $50,000 to $150,000 to reflect an overall gain on the deemed sale of
$200,000).21 With all of LLC's value reflected in the capital accounts of A and B, LLC
can then issue an interest to C with an initial capital account and a current liquidation
value of $0 and qualify that interest as a profits interest.
If LLC liquidates based on percentages or according to units or other indicia of
ownership, C's one-third LLC interest will not qualify as a profits interest under Rev.
Proc. 93-27. For example, if LLC simply liquidates based on percentages, C would
receive $100,000 in proceeds (that is, 33 1/3% of $300,000) if LLC liquidated
immediately after C receives an interest in LLC. Further, if LLC liquidates based on
units or other indicia of ownership, C would have the right to receive proceeds upon
a liquidation based on the units or other ownership interests in LLC that C holds. As
a result, under either approach, C's LLC interest will not qualify as a profits interest
under Rev. Proc. 93-27 because, in each case, C will receive an interest with a
current liquidation value. C, therefore, will face a taxable event at the time C
receives the interest in LLC.
C's interest in LLC potentially could qualify as a profits interest under a priority
distribution approach provided the members appropriately amend LLC's liquidation
provisions before admitting C to take into account all LLC unrealized appreciation.
On the one hand, if A and B structured LLC to liquidate first by returning the
20 1993-2 C.B. 343.
21 For a further discussion of capital account book-ups, see Steven R. Schneider, Regulations Catch Up With
Reality, "Booking Up" Before Admitting a Service Partner, 45 Tax Mgmt. Memorandum 16 (August 9, 2004).
$100,000 in initial capital and then by dividing residual value by percentages or units,
C's interest would not qualify as a profits interest because C, as a holder of an LLC
percentage interest or LLC units, would immediately receive LLC residual proceeds
upon an LLC liquidation. On the other hand, if the members amend LLC's liquidation
provisions to cause LLC to liquidate by first returning $300,000 to A and B and then
dividing residual value based on percentages or units, they could ensure that C's
interest qualifies as a profits interest. Under this approach, A and B would hold all
current LLC liquidation value, C would receive no liquidation proceeds upon an
immediate liquidation of LLC, and C's interest would be eligible for treatment as a
profits interest. This example illustrates how a properly structured priority distribution
liquidation approach can effectively achieve the same positive tax results for C as a
capital account book-up.
Example 6: Effect of Special Allocations and Nonrecourse Deductions.
A and B form LLC to purchase and lease Building. A contributes $20,000 and B
contributes $180,000 to LLC. LLC then acquires Building for $1,000,000 with a
$100,000 down payment and a $900,000 nonrecourse loan from Bank. LLC also
sets aside $100,000 as working capital. A and B agree to allocate profits first to
reverse prior losses and then 90% to B and 10% to A. Losses will also be shared
90% by B and 10% by A after reversing prior profits, except that LLC will allocate all
depreciation on Building to B. LLC depreciates Building over 40 years ($25,000 per
year). During its first five years, LLC generates no profit or loss aside from
depreciation on Building. During the same five-year period, LLC amortizes no
portion of the principal on the $900,000 nonrecourse loan.
Beginning Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities






Total Assets $1,100,000 Total Liabilities plus Equity $1,100,000
If LLC liquidates based on capital accounts and satisfies the other substantial
economic effect requirements, its special allocation of $25,0000 in depreciation on
Building to B in each of the first four years will be respected. These $100,000 in
depreciation deductions will qualify as "equity deductions" (that is, deductions funded
by member equity contributions as opposed to LLC borrowings) and will reduce B's
capital account from $180,000 to $80,000.22 Because LLC has generated no other
items of profit or loss, A's capital account will remain at $20,000.
End of Year Four Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities






Total Assets $1,000,000 Total Liabilities plus Equity $1,000,000
If A and B decided not to liquidate according to capital accounts, the results for the
first four years are less certain. For instance, without the benefits of the substantial
economic effect safe harbor, B may have difficulty ensuring that the government will
respect its special allocations of depreciation deductions. To protect B's special
allocations, A and B could attempt to draft LLC allocation and distribution provisions
providing for economic effect equivalence. Unfortunately, the members are very
unlikely to accomplish this goal by liquidating based on straight percentages, units or
other indicia of ownership because those approaches should always result in
liquidation distributions differing from capital account based liquidation distributions.
As an alternative, perhaps A and B could satisfy the economic equivalence test
through an elaborate priority distribution formula. This approach, however, would
require, at very least, a significant level of creative thinking, a particularly skilled
drafter and a high tolerance for complication. In all other circumstances, PIP
presumably will govern LLC's allocations of depreciation and allocate those
deductions between A and B.
In year five, the book value of Building will fall below the nonrecourse debt
encumbering Building by $25,000. As a result, LLC's $25,000 in depreciation will
qualify as a nonrecourse deduction (that is, a deduction funded by nonrecourse debt
as opposed to member equity).23 Regardless of the terms included in LLC's
operating agreement, LLC nonrecourse deductions will not have economic effect
because Bank alone will bear the economic risk of loss on such deductions. 24
22 See Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(m), Ex. 1.
23 See Treas. Reg. §1.704.2(c).
24 Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(b)(1).
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Nevertheless, such allocations will be deemed in accordance with PIP provided
(i) LLC specifically satisfies the three economic effect requirements in either the
primary or alternate substantial economic effect test (that is, based on the plain
wording of the regulations, economic effect equivalence will not suffice); (ii) LLC
allocates nonrecourse deductions reasonably consistently with other allocations of
significant items from Building having substantial economic effect; (iii) LLC's
operating agreement contains a minimum gain chargeback provision; and (iv) all
other material allocations and capital account adjustments under LLC's operating
agreement are recognized. 25
Based on the discussion above, B could ensure that its special allocation of $25,000
in year five depreciation survives scrutiny by insisting upon, among other things, LLC
liquidating according to capital accounts. B cannot secure its special allocation of
year five depreciation if LLC liquidates in some other way. Indeed, without a capital
account based liquidation, LLC's $25,000 nonrecourse depreciation deduction will
not have economic effect and will not be deemed in accordance with PIP. This
means that LLC will have to allocate the deduction between A and B under general
PIP presumptions and facts and circumstances. Further, as stated above, this is
true even if A and B succeeded in their attempt to qualify LLC's allocations under the
economic effect equivalence test.
PIP begins by presuming that all partner interests are equal (determined on a per
capita basis). A and B, therefore, will initially be presumed to have equal rights to
LLC's $25,000 nonrecourse depreciation deduction ($12,500 each). This PIP per
capita presumption is rebuttable. However, in light of the almost complete lack of
authority on the per capital presumption, B's ability to successfully rebut the
presumption is unclear. A and B should have a strong argument for rebutting the
presumption and allocating the LLC deductions based on their relative capital
contributions and their general profit and loss sharing percentages (that is, 90% to B
and 10% to A). They may also have a reasonable argument that, provided they
25 Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(e). This regulation provides, in part, that allocations of nonrecourse deductions are
deemed in accordance with PIP only if throughout the full term of the partnership requirements (1) and (2) of
Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) are satisfied, (i.e., capital accounts are maintained in accordance with
Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) and liquidating distributions are required to be made in accordance with
positive capital account balances), and requirement (3) of either Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) or Treas.
Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) is satisfied (i.e., partners with deficit capital accounts have an unconditional deficit
restoration obligation or agree to a qualified income offset). The regulation, therefore, appears to mandate
that LLC satisfy the requirements of the three-part economic effect test in order to have their nonrecourse
deduction allocations deemed in accordance with PIP- Accordingly, based on a plain reading of the
language of the regulation, taxpayers apparently cannot rely on economic equivalence as a means of gaining
access to the PIP safe harbor.
satisfy economic effect equivalence, their consequences under PIP should mirror
their treatment under the nonrecourse deduction PIP safe harbor (that is, they should
be treated as if they effectively satisfied the nonrecourse deduction PIP safe harbor
even though they technically did not satisfy the safe harbor). In any event, by
deciding not to liquidate according to capital accounts, A and B are taking a
significant risk with the security of B's special allocations of depreciation.
Example 7: Impact of Section 514(c)(9)(E).
D, a real estate developer, and P, a tax exempt pension plan, form LLC to operate
rental real estate. D contributes $1,000 and P contributes $100,000 to LLC. LLC
acquires Building for $1,000,000 with a $101,000 down payment and a $899,000
loan from Bank. Under the terms of the LLC Agreement, profits are allocated (i) first
to reverse prior losses, (ii) second to provide P with a 10% annual preferred return
on capital, and (iii) finally 70% to P and 30% to D. Losses, after reversing prior
profits, are allocated 70% to P and 30% to D. In its first year of operations, LLC
generates $20,000 in net income and distributes $10,000 to P to match P's preferred
return. In its second year, LLC produces $0 in net income and makes no
distributions. After completing its second year, LLC liquidates.
Based on the LLC Agreement, if LLC satisfies the substantial economic effect safe
harbor, it would allocate $17,000 in year one income to P and $3,000 to D. These
allocations would have a corresponding effect on member capital accounts. Then
LLC would reduce P's capital account by $10,000 to reflect its $10,000 preferred
return distribution. Finally, upon liquidation, LLC would distribute its remaining
$111,000 in assets according to capital accounts by distributing $107,000 to P and
$4,000 to D. With safe harbor protection, both P and D can assume that LLC's
allocations will be respected for tax purposes.
In this particular case, P is likely to be especially interested in having LLC liquidate
according to capital accounts. Indeed, because LLC will encumber Building, Building
should qualify as "debt-financed property" for purposes of Section 514. As debt-
financed property, P's share of income from Building presumably will be subject to
tax as unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) notwithstanding P's tax exempt
status unless LLC meets the requirements of Section 514(c)(9)(E). 26 For allocations
to qualify under Section 514(c)(9)(E), allocations absolutely must have substantial
26 Section 514(c)(9)(B)(vi)(lll). P could also avoid UBTI if D was a "qualified organization" under
Section 514(c)(9)(B)(vi)(I), or if all of LLC's allocations to P constituted "qualified allocations" under
Section 168(h)(6). Under the facts of the example, however, D will not qualify as a qualified organization and
LLC's allocations to P all will not constitute qualified allocations.
economic effect within the meaning of Section 704(b)(2).21 Obviously, the easiest
way to satisfy this requirement is to meet the substantial economic effect safe harbor
(including the requirement to liquidate according to capital accounts). Technically,
however, economic effect equivalence should also be an option.
As discussed above, allocations having economic effect equivalence are deemed to
have economic effect. Economic effect equivalence, therefore, should suffice for
Section 514(c)(9)(E). P, however, is unlikely to receive adequate assurances that
LLC's allocations will have economic effect equivalence. For instance, if LLC
selected a priority distribution liquidation approach, LLC presumably would fail
economic effect equivalence because its liquidation results would generally differ
from a liquidation based upon capital accounts. Returning to our example, if LLC
liquidated (i)first by returning initial capital; (ii)second by paying P's aggregate
unpaid preferred return, and (iii) third by dividing residual cash 70% to P and 30% to
D, P would receive $110,000 upon liquidation ($100,000 initial capital plus $10,000
unpaid year two preferred return) while D receives $1,000 (D's initial capital). This
result clearly differs from the result described above for a capital account based
liquidation. Accordingly, because its priority distribution liquidation will not mirror a
capital account liquidation, LLC's allocations will not have economic effect
equivalence. Further, based on the plain language of Section 514(c)(9)(E), LLC
cannot protect P from UBTI under Section 514 even if its allocations satisfy PIP. For
these reasons, if P wishes to avoid UBTI, P should insist upon LLC liquidating
according to capital accounts. P, however, should carefully consider the economic
differences in liquidation approaches before making any final decisions.
Example 8: Partnership Investment Fund Issues.
GP and LP form Fund as a limited partnership. LP contributes $1,000 and GP
provides solely services to Fund.28 After a 10% cumulative annual preferred return,
the residual profit is to be shared 80-20 between LP and GP. Fund uses the $1,000
to purchase Investments A and B for $500 each. GP has a capital account deficit
restoration obligation (a "DRO") to the extent that it receives distributions in excess
of its cumulative profit share (that is, a "clawback").
27 Section 514(c)(9)(E)(i)(Il). To satisfy the requirements of Section 514(c)(9)(E), LLC must also meet the so-
called "fractions rule" which requires that allocations to an exempt partner in a partnership not result in the
partner receiving a share of overall partnership income for any year greater than such partner's share of
overall partnership loss for the year for which such partner's loss share will be the smallest. Section
514(c)(9)(E)(i)(l).
28 Generally, GP would contribute 1% of the capital to an investment fund, however, for simplification no
contribution is shown here.
At the end of year one, Investment A appreciates to $650 and Investment B
appreciates to $600. Fund sells Investment A on December 31st and recognizes
$150 of gain. Fund then distributes the $650 of cash as follows: First, $500 to LP to
return its capital, then $100 to LP as a preferred return; then the remaining $50 is
distributed $30 to GP (based on GP's residual share of the $250 of total realized and
unrealized income) and $20 to LP. At the end of year two, Fund sells Investment B
for $600 and liquidates. As a result of the year two preference, LP is entitled to the
remaining $600. Furthermore, because GP received distributions of $30 in year one
that exceed GP's 20% share of the aggregate $50 of residual income ($250 total
income less $200 total LP preference), GP contributes $20 to Fund pursuant to its
DRO. This amount is also paid to LP.
Section 704(b) Capital Accounts
LP GP Total
Contribution $1,000 $0 $1,000
Year 1 realized income
Preference +$100 $0 +$100
Residual +$40 +$10 +$50
Distribution ($620) ($30) ($650)
End of year 1 $520 ($20) $500
Year 2 realized income
Preference +$100 $0 +$100
Residual $0 $0 $0
End of year 2 $620 ($20) $600
GP contribution +$20 +$20
Ending Capital Accounts $620 $0 $620
Economic Capital Accounts
LP GP Total
Contribution $1,000 $0 $1,000
Year 1 realized and unrealized income
Preference +$100 $0 +$100
Residual +$120 +$30 +$150
Distribution ($620) ($30) ($650)
End of year 1 partner accounts $600 $0 $600
Year 2 income
Clawback $20 ($20) $0
GP contribution +$20 +$20
Ending partner accounts $620 $0 $620
This example illustrates a fact pattern where the allocation of the year one income
between GP and LP may differ depending on whether Fund follows the §704(b) safe
harbors. In a capital account based liquidation that follows the safe harbors, the
allocations in year one would be limited to the realized income of $150. Thus, if
Fund's agreement allocates annual income first to LP to satisfy any accrued but
unpaid preferred return and then 80-20 to LP and GP, respectively, Fund would
allocate the first $100 to LP and the remaining $50 would be allocated $40 to LP and
$10 to GP. However, in an agreement with a priority distribution based liquidation
which does not satisfy economic effect equivalence, the tax allocations would be
based on PIP. Under PIP, unlike the §704(b) safe harbors, there is nothing to
indicate that the allocation of the $150 in realized income should not take into
account the economic sharing of the $100 unrealized income.29 In fact, since GP
receives a distribution based on the cumulative realized and unrealized profits, there
is even more support for looking to the sharing of the total income. Thus, if Fund's
liquidation waterfall provides for a return of contributions followed by a preferred
return and an 80-20 residual sharing, Fund would distribute the total $1,250 of Fund
assets as follows:
LP GP Total
Return Contributed Capital $1,000 $0 $1,000
Preferred Return $100 $0 $100
Residual $120 $30 $150
Total $1,220 $30 $1,250
Based on the above distribution schedule, the economic sharing of the $250 of
realized and unrealized gain is $220 to LP and $30 to GP. If PIP allocates taxable
income in the same ratio, similar to a "bottom line" allocation under the §704(b) safe
harbors,30 then the $150 would be allocated $132 to GP ((220/250) x $150) and $18
to LP ((30/250) x $150).
29 A leading treatise describes PIP in the following manner:
Unfortunately, the helpful mechanics of the safe harbor, such as the value-equals-basis and five-year
rules, are not applicable to the determination of a partner's interest in the partnership. Thus, it is far
from clear that identical results would in fact be achieved under both sets of rules, and drafters of
partnership agreements who stray from the safe harbor do so at their peril. Moreover, it is far from clear
that the courts will reach the correct result if left to glean the appropriate allocation scheme from the
economics of the transaction. [footnote omitted]
See McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, supra, note 10, 10.02, at 10-58, 59. See also Estate of Ballantyne,
83 TCM 1896 (2002), af'd, 341 F3d 802 (8th Cir. 2003).
30 Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(1)(vii).
Whether the priority distribution based liquidation can rely on the §704(b) concept of
income (generally limited to realized income absent a revaluation 31) may depend on
whether the economic equivalence test is satisfied. Similar to Example 7 above,
there is a real question as to whether economic equivalence would apply because,
as a result of the cumulative priority return, the economic results from a priority
distribution based liquidation may differ from the results of a capital account based
liquidation. For example, if Fund liquidated in year three without earning any
additional income, the accrual of an additional $100 LP preference would result in LP
receiving 100% of Fund's cumulative profits under a priority distribution approach
(that is, LP would receive the entire $1,250). In contrast, under a capital account
based approach, GP would have been entitled to the $10 of realized income
allocated to GP in year one since that amount would have increased its capital
account without a subsequent loss reversal. This economic difference would
arguably prevent a priority distribution approach from satisfying the economic
equivalence test.32
Conclusion
As a growing number of practitioners prepare LLC Operating
Agreements without capital account based liquidation provisions, more and more
practitioners and clients assume that liquidating according to capital accounts has
gone with the wind. For simple arrangements, in special circumstances, and
perhaps in certain industries, this may be true. In fact, taxpayers in those situations
probably never really needed to liquidate their LLCs according to capital accounts in
the first place. For many taxpayers, however, liquidating according to capital
accounts still represents the best and most prudent choice. Further, for some
31 See Treas. Reg, §1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f).
3 The treatment of subsequent year's priority accruals and clawback provisions raise many federal income tax
issues that are beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed discussion of these issues see Steven R.
Schneider, How Do Investment Fund Clawback Provisions Affect Partnership Income Allocations?, 7 J. of
Passthrough Entities (July-August 2004).
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others, liquidating based on capital accounts may actually be essential. In the end,
whether an LLC should liquidate based on capital accounts will often depend entirely
upon the particular facts of each case. Taxpayers, therefore, should consider all
potential tax issues, as well as all potential economic consequences, before deciding
whether or not to liquidate their LLCs based on capital accounts.
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